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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL LAW ON PUBLIC HEALTH
PREPAREDNESS
BENJAMIN E. BERKMAN,* SUSAN C. KIM** & LINDSAY F. WILEY***
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, the United States has faced an array of largescale public health threats. The events of September 11, 2001, quickly
followed by the anthrax mailings, exposed the country’s vulnerability to
physical and biological terrorist attacks.1 Global outbreaks of various lifethreatening infectious diseases, such as severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS), the West Nile Virus, and pandemic influenza have not only taken
lives, but have also significantly affected political and economic systems on
a national and international scale.2 Furthermore, the inadequate response
to—and the aftermath of—Hurricane Katrina highlighted the direct link

* Benjamin E. Berkman, JD, MPH, is a faculty member in the Department of Clinical Bioethics,
National Institutes of Health. He also serves as the Deputy Director of the Bioethics Core at
the National Human Genome Research Institute and is an adjunct professor at Georgetown
University Law Center. The opinions expressed here are the author’s and do not reflect the
policies and positions of the National Institutes of Health, the U.S. Public Health Service, or
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. This research was sponsored by a grant
from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The research was also supported in part
by the Intramural Research Program of the National Human Genome Research Institute,
National Institutes of Health. The authors would like to thank Peter Jacobson and Jeffrey
Wassermann for their excellent comments and guidance. The authors would also like to thank
Peter Currie, Astrid Dorelien, Brittany Griffin, Lindsay Holden, Meredith Larson, and Lee
Melvin Peralta for their research assistance.
** Susan C. Kim, JD, MPH, is a Project Manager and Manager of Grants and
Communications at the O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at Georgetown
University.
*** Lindsay F. Wiley, JD, MPH, is an Assistant Professor of Law at the American University
Washington College of Law.
1. See Susan West Marmagas, Laura Rasar King & Michelle G. Chuk, Public Health’s
Response to a Changed World: September 11, Biological Terrorism, and the Development of
an Environmental Health Tracking Network, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1226, 1227 (2003)
(discussing the need for increased protection of the public health infrastructure after the
September 11 attacks).
2. Lawrence O. Gostin, Why Rich Countries Should Care About the World’s Least
Healthy People, 298 JAMA 89, 90 (2007).
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between the destruction of infrastructure caused by natural disasters and
public health crises.3
The emergence of these public health threats has prompted robust
efforts to improve United States emergency preparedness4 at all levels of
government. While states and localities have traditionally had primary
responsibility for conducting these kinds of public health activities,5 it has
become clear that there is also a salient need for federal involvement in
preparing for and responding to public health emergencies. An effective
response to a large-scale public health threat will require coordinated action
across all levels of government. Events of significant size and scope will
almost certainly not be limited to one state or locality and will demand an
extensive commitment of federal resources and guidance.
As the public health community has engaged in efforts to improve the
nation’s emergency preparedness infrastructure,6 many of the most dramatic
changes have occurred at the federal level, including the creation of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as a new Cabinet department—the
largest restructuring of federal administrative agency responsibility since the
New Deal.7 For many years, the federal government has provided funding
and guidance for disaster preparedness and recovery through its power to
spend for the general welfare and its power to regulate interstate
commerce.8 However, following the terrorist attacks of 2001 and 2002 and
outbreaks of emerging and reemerging infectious diseases, the federal
government began to take a more proactive role in prevention of,
3. See generally SELECT BIPARTISAN COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR &
RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA, A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE: FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT BIPARTISAN
COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA, H.R.
REP. NO. 109-377, at 1, 267 (2006) [hereinafter COMM. TO INVESTIGATE KATRINA], available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/katrina.html#zip (explaining the ineffectiveness
of the public health infrastructure in the wake of the destruction caused by Hurricane Katrina).
4. For purposes of this paper, we will use the term “public health emergency
preparedness” (or just “emergency preparedness”) to encompass the policies and laws
undertaken to protect the public from biological harms, including the prevention and
mitigation of dangers to the public’s health posed by diseases, natural disasters, and
bioterrorism.
5. COMM. TO INVESTIGATE KATRINA, supra note 3, at 201. See also David L. Feinberg,
Hurricane Katrina and the Public Health-Based Argument for Greater Federal Involvement in
Disaster Preparedness and Response, 13 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 596, 597 (2006).
6. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN 1-2 (2004) [hereinafter
NRP], available at http://www.iir.com/global/FusionCenter/NRPbaseplan.pdf.
7. Id. at 9, 78-79. See also U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FACT SHEET: LEADERSHIP AND
MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES FOR HOMELAND SECURITY MERGER (2004), available at http://www.
dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0345.shtm.
8. EILEEN SALINSKY, NAT’L HEALTH POL’Y FORUM, NHPF BACKGROUND PAPER: PUBLIC HEALTH
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS: FUNDAMENTALS OF THE “SYSTEM” 13 (2002), available at
http://www.nhpf.org/library/background-papers/BP_Public_Health_4-02.pdf.
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preparedness for, and response to biological weapons attacks and
infectious disease outbreaks under the auspices of providing for national
security.9
This shift represents a departure from the traditional federal-state
relationship in the area of emergency preparedness. A longstanding
principle of federal involvement in disaster response, which is clearly
embodied in the National Response Plan (NRP), is the premise that
“[i]ncidents are typically managed at the lowest possible geographic,
organizational, and jurisdictional level.”10 The view of federal action as
supplementary to state and local actions with respect to emergency
preparedness is rooted in our federalist system, which grants limited powers
As federal involvement in emergency
to the federal government.11
preparedness grows, consideration of the constitutional bases for federal
action in this arena and the potential constitutional limits on federal
encroachment into traditional state functions becomes increasingly
important.
Increased federal involvement in emergency preparedness has also
raised important questions about the way that federal laws, policies, and
programs affect state and local preparedness and response efforts.
Emergency preparedness combines one of the most fundamental functions
of the federal government – national security12 – with one of the most
fundamental functions of the state governments – public health.13 Among
national security concerns, emergency preparedness is unique in that
jurisdiction for preparedness and response is not exclusively federal.14
Among public health concerns, biological weapons attacks and infectious
disease outbreaks are distinguished by increasing federalization of
preparedness and response.15 The result is “a myriad of laws [at the local,
state, and federal level] that must be considered, most of which were
developed to address more mundane public health matters, or designed to
respond to more traditional emergency situations.”16

9. GEORGE W. BUSH, THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 1 (2002), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/book.pdf.
10. Id. at 6.
11. SALINSKY, supra note 8, at 12.
12. Homeland Security, WHITEHOUSE.GOV, http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/homelandsecurity (last visited Sept. 3, 2010).
13. See Wendy E. Parmet, Health Care and the Constitution: Public Health and the Role
of the State in the Framing Era, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 267, 272 (1993).
14. See Wendy E. Parmet, After September 11: Rethinking Public Health Federalism, 30 J.
L. MED. & ETHICS 201, 201 (2002).
15. See id.
16. John D. Blum, Too Strange to be Just Fiction: Legal Lessons from a Bioterrorist
Simulation, the Case of TOPOFF 2, 64 LA. L. REV. 905, 915 (2004).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

158

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 4:155

This article will present qualitative interview data that were collected as
part of a larger project to explore the impact of federal law on public health
preparedness.17 As a foundation, Section II will briefly outline some of the
most salient ways in which the federal role in public health preparedness has
expanded in the past decade. Section III will provide some background
about the structure and purpose of the larger Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC)-funded project. Section IV will present our findings
from the final phase of this project—a series of qualitative interviews with
federal policymakers. These data will be presented in four parts: methods,
results, discussion, and conclusion.
II. AN INCREASING FEDERAL ROLE IN PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS
The last decade has been marked by increasing federalization of public
health preparedness and response—an area that was traditionally handled
almost exclusively at the state and local level.18 The terrorist attacks of
2001 and 2002, the SARS outbreak, and concerns about pandemic
influenza prompted a series of federal legislative efforts to enhance
emergency preparedness. These include the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (Bioterrorism Act),19
the Project Bioshield Act of 2004 (Project Bioshield),20 the Public Readiness
and Emergency Preparedness Act of 2005 (PREPA),21 and the Pandemic and
All-Hazards Preparedness Act of 2006 (PAHPA).22 These legislative reforms
were followed by federal efforts to develop comprehensive emergency
response plans intended to implement and coordinate federal preparedness
and response law, including the National Response Framework (NRF)23 and
the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan
(NSPIIP).24
17. Peter D. Jacobson et al., The Role of Law in Public Health Preparedness:
Opportunities and Challenges, Final Project Report 1 (April 23, 2010) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
18. COMM. TO INVESTIGATE KATRINA, supra note 3, at 201.
19. Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
20. Project BioShield Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-276, 118 Stat. 835 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
21. Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-6d,
247d-6e (2006).
22. Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act, Pub. L. No. 109-417, 120 Stat. 2831
(2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
23. NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. 1 (2008) [hereinafter
NRF], available at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf.
24. See HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL STRATEGY
FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 1-2 (2006) [hereinafter NSPIIP], available at
http://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/wdc/documents/pandemicinfluenza.pdf.
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Although nearly any federal statute might come into play in preparing
for and responding to a public health emergency, there are two key statutes
in which the majority of relevant federal law (including the reforms described
above) is codified: The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act (Stafford Act)25 and the Public Health Service Act (PHSA).26
The Stafford Act provides the framework for federal involvement in disaster
relief and emergency assistance and sets forth various provisions for disaster
and emergency preparedness.27 Relevant portions of the PHSA specifically
address public health emergencies, which include biological security events
as well as the public health consequences of other types of events.28 The
NRF draws from both Acts, as well as from other sources of authority, to
establish what is intended to be an “all-hazards” plan29 for responding to a
variety of disasters and emergencies. Similarly, the NSPIIP sets forth a
coordinated plan for pandemic preparedness.30
Both the Stafford Act and PHSA have been expanded to provide for an
increased federal role. While much of the Stafford Act deals with
emergency and disaster response, the Act also now addresses the federal
government’s role in preparedness efforts.31 Originally, the Act contained
only a few provisions on preparation and mitigation,32 and some of these
were limited to post-disaster mitigation – they applied only to areas that had
already experienced a major catastrophe.33 Several amendments34 to the
25. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121207 (2006). See also NRP, supra note 6, at 5, 79 (presenting an overview of the Stafford
Act).
26. Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 201 (2006).
27. See Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
5121-207 (2006).
28. Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201, 247d, 300hh-13, 300hh-14 (2006).
29. See, e.g., Ernest B. Abbot, Homeland Security in the 21st Century: New Inroads on
the State Police Power, 36 URB. LAW. 837, 840-41 (2004) (describing the evolution of the
“all-hazards” approach to emergency management).
30. NSPIIP, supra note 24.
31. Although the original version of the Stafford Act contained some provisions on
disaster mitigation, such provisions were significantly multiplied when the Act was amended by
the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000. See Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106390, 114 Stat. 1552 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
32. See, e.g., Disaster Relief Act of 1974 §§ 101, 401, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121, 5171
(1982).
33. See, e.g., §§ 301-03, 306.
34. See, e.g., §§ 102, 302; Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-56, § 1013(b)(1), 115 Stat. 399; Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and
Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 10773, 115 Stat. 688 (2001); Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub.
L. No. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1355 (2006).
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Act have since circumvented this limitation and have expanded the federal
government’s authority to encourage disaster preparedness in all parts of
the country.
The PHSA,35 which “supplements, but does not supplant” the Stafford
36
Act, similarly provides for a prominent federal role in planning for and
responding to public health emergencies.37 In addition to outlining the role
of the Secretary of Health and Human Services in declaring a public health
emergency to trigger federal assistance,38 a series of amendments to the
PHSA have sought to enhance national preparedness for public health
emergencies. For example, in 2002, the Bioterorrism Act amended the
PHSA to set aside funds specifically for assessing national public health
preparedness needs and for grants to assist state and local government and
private health-care sector preparedness efforts.39
In 2006, PAHPA attempted to increase accountability for state and local
spending of federal preparedness funds by requiring the Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS) Secretary to “develop and apply
measurable evidence-based benchmarks and objective standards to
measure the preparedness of state and local grantees, including annual test
and exercise requirements.”40 PAHPA also specifically mandated the
development of criteria for evaluating state pandemic influenza plans41 and
DHHS and DHS have worked together to release an initial template for
review criteria.42 However, the law allows use of “existing objective
standards,”43 which means that for general all-hazards preparedness, DHHS
and DHS may revert to the status quo of requiring states to collect data and

35. See Vickie J. Williams, Fluconomics: Preserving Our Hospital Infrastructure During and
After a Pandemic, 7 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 99, 134-35 (2007) (stating that the PHSA
specifically addresses the responsibilities of the federal government during public health
emergencies). See also Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-300 (2006).
36. Id. at 135.
37. Id.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 247d(a) (2006).
39. 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-1 to -3, 247d-3a to-3b (2006).
40. TRUST FOR AMERICA’S HEALTH, READY OR NOT? PROTECTING THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH FROM
DISEASES, DISASTERS, AND BIOTERRORISM 49-50 (2007).
41. Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act Pub. L. No. 109-417, § 201, 120 Stat.
2831, 2837, 2839-40 (2006) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 247d-3a (2006)).
42. ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PREPAREDNESS & RESPONSE, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
PANDEMIC AND ALL-HAZARDS PREPAREDNESS ACT PROGRESS REPORT 17 (2007), available at
http://healthyamericans.org/reports/bioterror07/PAHPAProgressReport.pdf.
43. Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act § 201 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 247d-3a (2006)).
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report on six of the twenty-three performance measures set forth in the
existing CDC preparedness goal.44
In addition to increased federal funding of state and local preparedness,
legislative reforms have also significantly expanded the federal government’s
relatively recent forays into direct federal involvement in preparedness
through the development and enhancement of the National Disaster
Medical System (NDMS),45 the Emergency System for Advance Registration
of Volunteer Health Professions (ESAR-VHP),46 the Strategic National
Stockpile (“SNS”)47 of essential pharmaceutical resources, and the CDC’s
National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (“NEDSS”).48
The
establishment and expansion of these programs signal that the federal
government is moving beyond the confines of its traditional role as adviser
and financer of state and local preparedness and response efforts.49
In 2008, updates to the NRF similarly reflected an evolution in the
relationship between federal, state, and local players in emergency and
disaster response.50 Language that had once emphasized the primacy of
44. See, e.g., Announcement from Sylvia Dawson, Grants Team Lead, Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention to Colleagues at Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
app. 1, at 7-8 (Sept. 21, 2007), available at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/planning/coopagree
ment/pdf/fy07announcement.pdf; CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PANDEMIC INFLUENZA GUIDANCE SUPPLEMENT TO THE 2006 PUBLIC
HEALTH EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT PHASE II 5, 20-25 (2006), available
at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/planning/coopagreement/pdf/phase2-panflu-guidance.pdf.
45. The NDMS operates pursuant to section 2812 of the Public Health Service Act. See
38 U.S.C. § 8117(e) (2006).
46. HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., EMERGENCY
SYSTEM FOR ADVANCE REGISTRATION OF VOLUNTEER HEALTH PROFESSIONALS (ESAR-VHP) – LEGAL
AND REGULATORY ISSUES 9-14 (2006), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/Research/
PDF/ESAR%20VHP%20Report.pdf. The name has changed from ESAR-HPV to ESAR-VHP.
See About ASPR, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.phe.gov/about/Pages/
default.aspx (last visited Oct. 23, 2010).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6b (2006).
48. National Electronic Disease Surveillance System, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/nedss/index.htm (last visited July 30, 2010).
49. See, e.g., Bill Frist, Public Health and National Security: The Critical Role of Increased
Federal Support, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2002, at 117, 120-21 (“Congress appropriated a
record $3 billion in December 2002 for antibioterrorism activities, including more than $1
billion dedicated to upgrading state and local public health capabilities and hospital
preparedness.”).
50. The National Response Plan of 2004 emphasized that “incidents are typically
managed at the lowest possible geographic, organizational, and jurisdictional level.” See
NRP, supra note 6, at 6. The National Response Framework of 2008 softened this statement
and added new language pointing to the importance of federal involvement: “Incidents must
be managed at the lowest possible jurisdictional level and supported by additional capabilities
when needed. It is not necessary that each level be overwhelmed prior to requesting
resources from another level.” See NRF, supra note 23, at 10.
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local control was softened to highlight the importance of the federal role,
while stopping short of promising federal responsibility for response efforts.51
Furthermore, the Catastrophic Incident Annex of the NRF now provides for
expedited and increased federal involvement in response efforts under
certain extreme conditions.52 When triggered by a catastrophic event, the
revisions bypass traditional requirements that a state governor request
federal assistance and that an incident first must overwhelm state and local
resources before federal authorities may become involved.53
Estimates of overall federal funding for emergency preparedness vary,
depending how broadly one defines the term. One report from the
Government Accountability Office calculates that from 2002 through 2007,
approximately $19 billion was distributed by DHS for emergency
preparedness, equipment, and training.54 It should be noted that this
estimate includes grants intended to help prepare for and respond to major
Alternatively, a
disasters of all types, including terrorist attacks.55
Congressional Research Service report focusing specifically on public health
preparedness states that “Congress has provided more than $9 billion in
grants to states to strengthen public health and hospital preparedness”
(approximately $1 billion per year) since 2002.56 In a recent analysis of
U.S. emergency preparedness efforts, Trust for America’s Health determined
that total federal funding for state and local all-hazard public health and
pandemic preparedness efforts amounts to more than $11 billion over the
past seven years.57

51. NRF, supra note 23, at 10.
52. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., CATASTROPHIC INCIDENT
ANNEX 1, 6 (2008), available at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf_Catastrophic
IncidentAnnex.pdf.
53. See id.
54. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-488T, HOMELAND SECURITY: DHS
IMPROVED ITS RISK-BASED GRANT PROGRAMS’ ALLOCATION AND MANAGEMENT METHODS, BUT
MEASURING PROGRAMS’ IMPACT ON NATIONAL CAPABILITIES REMAINS A CHALLENGE 1 (2008).
55. Id.
56. SARAH A. LISTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40159, PUBLIC HEALTH AND MEDICAL
PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE: ISSUES IN THE 111TH CONGRESS 5 (2009).
57. TRUST FOR AMERICA’S HEALTH, supra note 40, at 57. While these estimates vary, they
all indicate that significant federal funding is being allocated for state and local preparedness
activities. Given that our analysis is designed to focus on the effect of federal laws on state
and local preparedness activities, we do not attempt to resolve this debate. The exact amount
is less important than the shape of these federal funding mechanisms and the impact that
these grant programs are having on state and local preparedness efforts.
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III. A PROJECT TO ASSESS THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL LAW ON PUBLIC HEALTH
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
To date, there has been little systematic examination of the effects
(positive or negative) that this expanding federal role has on public health
emergency preparedness. Except for the on-going studies funded by the
CDC’s Public Health Law Program (PHLP),58 existing public health research
efforts that examine how public health operates have not often considered
law to be an important variable.59 The PHLP studies are a promising
beginning, though most of their projects deal with the effects of law on
specific programs (such as AIDS and immunization laws)60 as opposed to
studying the law’s influence on the broader public health system as this
paper will begin to describe.
To be sure, reforming public health law has been a topic of
considerable discussion, especially for bioterrorism preparedness.61 The
development of the CDC’s Model State Emergency Health Powers Act62 by
the Georgetown/Hopkins CDC Collaborating Centers for Law and the
Public’s Health (CLPH) is a prime example of the role law plays in
organizing public health practice.63 With the help of government officials,
public health experts, and other major stakeholders, CLPH faculty and staff
drafted and disseminated the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act
(MSEHPA), which gave local and state officials increased authority to protect

58. See Public Health Law Program, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www2a.cdc.gov/phlp/research.asp (last visited Sept. 2, 2010). See also Edward L.
Baker, Jr. & Jeffrey P. Koplan, Strengthening The Nation’s Public Health Infrastructure: Historic
Challenge, Unprecedented Opportunity, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2002, at 22. (“To improve
the legal foundation for public health practice and particularly to examine the need for
updating of public health statutes, the Public Health Law Program was created in 2000”).
59. Scott Burris et al., Making the Case for Laws That Improve Health: A Framework for
Public Health Law Research, 88 MILBANK Q. 169, 170 (2010).
60. See, e.g., Public Health Law Program, supra note 58.
61. See generally, e.g., INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC’S
HEALTH IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2002) (stating that pioneering work has gone into assisting states
in reforming their public health laws to address health preparedness needs, but a more
comprehensive effort is needed); Laura H. Kahn, State Report: A Prescription for Change: The
Need for Qualified Physician Leadership in Public Health, HEALTH AFF., July-Aug. 2003, at
241, 241-48 (stating that since the threat of future bioterrorism attacks will remain in the
future, state public health laws must be reformed).
62. See generally CTR. FOR LAW & PUBLIC’S HEALTH AT GEORGETOWN & JOHNS HOPKINS U.,
THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT 1 (2001) [hereinafter MSEHPA], available at
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf. (“The Act requires the development
of a comprehensive plan to provide a coordinated, appropriate response in the event of a
public health emergency.”).
63. Lawrence O. Gostin, Public Health Law in an Age of Terrorism: Rethinking Individual
Rights and Common Goods, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2002, at 83, 83.
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individuals and property during states of emergency.64 Forty-four states and
the District of Columbia have passed laws incorporating some portion of
MSEHPA.65 The Turning Point initiative has similarly stimulated reforms of
state-level public health codes.66 Neither project, however, was designed to
investigate empirically the role of law in public health practice.
This article presents data seeking to address this empirical void. Given
increased federal involvement in public health preparedness activities, we
undertook a project to provide policymakers with the first systematic
empirical analysis to understand how federal law shapes the public health
system’s disease preparedness activities and how public health officials are
adjusting to the changing federal legal environment. In particular, we
aimed to study the mechanisms through which federal laws provide funds for
specific activities and how these mechanisms shape, or constrain, the ways
in which states and localities can spend the funds.
As a framework for this project, we adopted the model set forth by
Mendez et al., which depicts a mechanism whereby physicians are
influenced by both an objective legal environment and a perceived legal
environment (see Figure 1).67 The study framework anticipated that public
health officials will not necessarily have an accurate understanding of the
key legal requirements in public health preparedness laws, but are more
likely to be influenced by what they perceive the legal environment to be.
Information

Perceived
Legal
Environment

Objective
Legal Environment

Federal

Implementation

State

Figure 1

64. Id. at 84.
65. CTR. FOR LAW & THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH, MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT
(MSEHPA): STATE LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY 1 (2006), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/
MSEHPA/MSEHPA%20Leg%20Activity.pdf.
66. Bobbie Berkowitz & Jack Thompson, The Turning Point Initiative: Responding to
Challenges in Public Health, 17 WASH. PUB. HEALTH 44, 44-45 (2000).
67. David Mendez et al., The Effect of Legal and Hospital Policies on Physician Response
to Prenatal Substance Exposure, 7 MATERNAL & CHILD HEALTH J. 187, 188 (2003).
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Phase 1 of the project involved constructing a detailed account of the
objective legal environment. To examine how law affects the structure of the
public health system and its ability to respond more effectively to the threat
of emerging infectious disease threats and other public health preparedness
needs, we first described, categorized, and analyzed current federal
mandates and funding arrangements affecting state and local public health
systems. This work was based on the premise that federal law provides a
general structure and framework for public health activities,68 while state
and local law provides parameters for the implementation and delivery of
specific programs and services.69
Although bioterrorism and emergency response efforts largely take place
at the local level, with public health as the core of first responders,70 federal
law substantially influences how state and local health departments allocate
their resources.71 Thus, our research in federal law focused on identifying
specific topical mandates, as well as analyzing funding mechanisms
provided to achieve those mandates.
Phase 2 involved a series of comparative case studies to determine how
state and local public health departments respond to emerging infectious
disease threats, bioterrorism, and other public health preparedness
challenges and how state laws shape those responses. These case studies
enabled us to capture the perceived legal environment: local policymakers’
understanding of what they are expected, or required, to accomplish and
the programmatic choices they make under federal law. We anticipated
that public health officials would be influenced by what they believe they are
expected to do, but that their perceptions may not match the objective legal
requirements.
Phase 3 involved a study of the federal government’s evolving role in
shaping policy and law affecting public health. Through a series of
interviews with a variety of federal policymakers, we aimed to determine
their understanding of the relationship between federal laws and state and
local preparedness activities. We attempted to explore how federal officials
view current public health preparedness functions; what public health role
they see for the federal government in the future; how their views will affect
state and local public health functions; how bioterrorism and emergency
response funds have been monitored, with particular attention to the relation
to other public health funding streams; and how funding streams for

68. See Anne Morse, Bioterrorism Preparedness for Local Health Departments, 19 J.
COMMUNITY HEALTH NURSING 203, 205 (2002).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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pandemic flu and other emergent infectious diseases have been determined
and coordinated.
The remainder of this article presents our qualitative interview data
about how federal policy-makers view the federal government’s current role
in preparedness activities and how that role will evolve in the future. The
analysis will focus on the extent to which there is discordance between the
objective legal framework and the subjective views of federal policy-makers
about how the federal legal framework impacts state preparedness activities.
IV. IMPACT OF FEDERAL LAW ON STATE PREPAREDNESS: FEDERAL POLICY-MAKER
PERSPECTIVE
The original data reported here were collected to specifically explore
federal policy-makers’ subjective perceptions of the relationship between
federal law and state/local public health preparedness activities. Our goal
was to examine how federal policymakers view the federal government’s
current role in preparedness activities and how that role will evolve in the
future. Given our previous work on the objective federal legal framework
for preparedness activities, we also wanted to compare these findings to the
respondents’ subjective understanding of the ways in which federal law
affects state and local public health functions. In particular, our study was
interested in the implementation and monitoring of federal public health
funding mechanisms and the implications that these programs have for state
and local public health preparedness activities.
A.

Methods
1. Selection of Respondents

In selecting interview candidates, attention was paid to ensuring a
diverse range of respondents in terms of experience, training, and
institutional affiliation. Even though the majority of questions were legal in
nature, both lawyers and non-lawyers were interviewed. In order to capture
high-level policy perspectives, as well as detailed on-the-ground experience,
both junior and senior agency officials were selected. Given the range of
federal agencies involved in public health preparedness activities,
respondents were recruited from all key governmental entities, with a focus
on DHS [including the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)]
and the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) [including the
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR),
CDC, and the National Institutes of Health (NIH)].
Recruitment of potential respondents was an iterative process. After the
relevant federal organizations had been identified, target individuals within
these organizations were selected to interview. Once that process was
completed, formal invitation letters were sent out via email. Subsequent
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follow-up was conducted through additional emails and telephone calls.
After a sufficient number of affirmative responses had been received, the
interview process was started. As interviews were conducted, recruitment
efforts were augmented by asking each respondent to identify potential
respondents at the close of each interview. In total, fourteen individuals
were interviewed. Respondents from all agencies included senior-level
administrators responsible for general oversight of their agencies’
preparedness activities, as well as key staff tasked with day-to-day
operational duties. As such, a range of experiences and expertise was
captured at both DHS and DHHS (and their affiliated sub-agencies). We do
not expect that additional interviews would have altered our results.
All participants were assured confidentiality and were promised that
neither they, nor their institution, would be identifiable. Therefore, this
paper does not report any information that could uniquely identify any
institution or respondent.
2. Interview Format and Design
A semi-structured interview protocol was developed for use in both inperson and telephone interviews. This protocol was designed in parallel
with the state and local interview protocol, but was adjusted for federal
respondents. Additionally, the protocol was structured so that questions
could be asked in either an individual or group setting. Overall, the
protocol was designed to provide consistency across interviews and
institutions, as well as to help organize note-taking. To account for the type
of position and level of responsibility of each respondent, there were slight
variations made to the protocol for each interview.
The protocol generally consisted of open-ended questions that gave the
interviewers flexibility to explore unanticipated, but fruitful, avenues of
inquiry. The questions fell into three broad categories: 1) evaluation and
oversight of preparedness activities; 2) collaboration and communication;
and 3) suggested improvements. Within these categories, additional topics
were explored in greater depth, such as the allocation and tracking of
federal funds to support state preparedness efforts, federal oversight over
state initiatives, barriers to effective implementation of state preparedness
activities, and communications among federal, state, and local entities.
3. Data Collection and Analysis
The interviews were conducted both in-person and on the telephone.
Generally lasting about sixty minutes, the interviews were primarily
conducted by a project investigator. Student research assistants provided
additional note-taking support for a number of interviews. If the respondent
consented, the interviews were digitally recorded for transcription purposes.
As such, transcripts were generated either from the audio recording or
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hand-written notes. To the extent possible, transcripts captured participants’
verbatim responses.
Once transcribed, N6 qualitative data analysis software, the latest
version in the NUD*IST series, was utilized. Qualitative analysis software
offers a number of tools to organize and compare complex data in one file.
After reviewing the transcripts, a list of key words was chosen for preliminary
analysis using a text search, which placed the selected word or phrase in
context. The results of these text searches led to the development of nodes,
which organized the data into broader concepts.
This was followed by a comprehensive review of the transcripts by the
research team. The interviews were read independently by four people, two
of whom were not involved in administering the interviews. To minimize
bias, initial content theme analysis was conducted by the fourth reader who
was not present at any of the interviews. Each reader was instructed to
review all interviews, placing salient statements into one or more nodes, not
limited to the categories identified by the qualitative data software. Readers
were then instructed to examine the statements in each individual node to
determine if they could be organized into coherent subtopics. After
extensive discussion between the readers, this analysis was revised and
expanded.
4. Study Limitations
This study has methodological limitations that should be considered
when interpreting the results. First, basic resource constraints limited the
number of interviews that we were able to conduct.
Though our
respondents’ respective agencies are generally reflective of the institutional
diversity in the federal government, the small number of participants cannot
completely capture the range of opinions within and between these
agencies. While we believe that we interviewed a sample of very
knowledgeable and influential people, we recognize that we have no way of
assessing whether their views on the issues discussed mirror those of the
larger population of people who are responsible for formulating and
executing public health policy.
Second, our sampling may be limited by self-selection bias. We only
spoke to participants who agreed to be interviewed, so it is possible that
individuals who were particularly occupied disproportionately declined
interview. Although our respondents provided us with a diversity of
information, we may not have fully captured all existing perspectives. The
participants may not be fully representative of all views at each organization.
Some of the individuals whom we would have liked to interview were either
unwilling or unable to meet with us. For the most part, we believe we did
not encounter this problem to any significant degree.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2010]

ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL LAW ON PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS

169

Third, our findings are limited to our participants’ self-reports. We did
not engage in an analysis of whether our participants’ statements reflect
actual preparedness outcomes.
B.

Results

The respondents’ comments can be divided into four distinct categories,
each with a number of subtopics. First, we begin with the respondents’
descriptions of the respective roles of federal and state governments.
Second, we examine the respondents’ discussion of coordination between
agencies and between different levels of government. Third, we explore the
perceived impact of federal funding mechanisms and procedures on states’
preparedness activities. Finally, we investigate the techniques used to
improve compliance and to ensure accountability.
1. Delineating State and Federal Responsibilities
a. The Role for Federal Government
While a minority of respondents mentioned the need for further
clarification and definition of federal and state roles, overall there seemed to
be a broadly shared understanding of the federal role vis-à-vis states and
localities. Most respondents noted that the primary role of the federal
government should be to provide resources and to empower, inform, and
educate states and localities to effectively plan for emergencies. This
dominant position implies an understanding that there are limits on the
appropriate role of the federal government with regard to preparedness
activities. While recognizing its limits, a minority of these respondents
expressed that the federal government must also be cognizant of the limited
capacity of the state and local governments in some situations and must be
ready to respond accordingly. A few of the respondents stressed that some
activities should be exclusively under the purview of the federal government,
such as the development of countermeasures.
Furthermore, a majority of the respondents expressed that there is a
unique role for the federal government as a coherent “enterprise” capable
of supporting research that leads to the development of capacity to deliver
products that will protect the public’s health in the event of an emergency
(e.g., vaccines, antitoxins). The development of such products should be a
“national” priority as opposed to one that could be reserved to a particular
state or locality. As one respondent noted, the federal government is best
positioned to stimulate and translate research into the actual development
of the products that will protect the public’s health. Federal officials have
the requisite bargaining power to coordinate the mass production of drugs
and diagnostic technology. Consistent with this position, the majority of
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participants also seemed to agree that states and localities cannot (and
should not) support their own drug and diagnostic research.
b. State Autonomy
A vocal minority emphasized the importance of state autonomy. So
long as they abide by broad federal parameters, states should be given the
discretion to establish their own prioritization decisions. States should be
allowed to establish priorities based on their respective capacities. For
example, with respect to centralized countermeasure distribution, some
states may not be able to effectively engage in that type of activity due to
geographic distribution, population characteristics, and general
infrastructure.
As such, in defining parameters, these respondents
articulated that it is import for the federal government to acknowledge that
states will have different capacities for preparedness planning. Moreover,
federal guidance and parameters should be flexible enough to allow for the
inevitable variance across states.
c. The Role of Non-governmental Actors
In addition to the roles of federal and state governments, a few
respondents raised the issue of the role for private entities and individuals.
These participants discussed an emerging paradigm shift within
preparedness activities: effective planning for all-hazards is a model built
upon “shared responsibility.” Experts no longer have the ability to solve
problems on their own. This means that the government at both the state
and federal levels should recognize and take advantage of entities outside
of the government. Furthermore, governments should acknowledge that
some individuals and businesses may have a more efficient ability to
disseminate information and products in the event of an emergency. For
example, large private retailers, such as Wal-Mart may be more centrally
and conveniently placed in remote areas to serve as distribution centers for
countermeasures.
d. Removing Barriers
A minority of respondents further noted that where there is room for
participation by multiple actors in public health preparedness initiatives
(ranging from research to delivery), the federal government should
encourage all relevant actors to participate by removing barriers. For
example, private stakeholders may be reluctant to engage in preparedness
activities because they are concerned with liability issues. These respondents
pointed out that legislation, such as the PREP Act, in specific situations
provides limited liability protection for actors who participate in emergency
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response, as well as a compensation fund for individuals injured by those
private actors.72
Along these lines, a few respondents noted particular concern regarding
barriers posed by procurement law. Currently, both the federal government
and many state governments engage with the private sector as a vendor in
response to an event.73 This, in turn, makes it difficult to identify the assets
and capabilities that the private sector can provide during a public health
emergency without some sort of pre-event contracting.74 These respondents
found that the continued contractual relationship between public and private
entities in the course of preparedness activities does not sufficiently address
current public health preparedness concerns. The primary identified
problem with this relationship is that state and federal governments are
unable to work with the private sector in advance of an event. The publicprivate relationship begins during or after a threat has manifested, which
means that the response is reactionary as opposed to being planned and
coordinated in advance. For example, if the federal government was able
to develop a national contract with large transportation companies
beforehand, states would know then which companies to turn to during an
event. Along these lines, having to contract with private vendors in the midst
of an event may lead to working with entities that are not objectively the
most appropriately positioned to respond to a given situation.
2. Encouraging Coordination and Shared Focus Between Various
Emergency Preparedness Actors
a. Silos of Perceived Authority
A majority of respondents expressed that there is a disconnect between
entities because of inter-institutional authority disputes, or “silos of perceived
authority” as one respondent described it. At the federal level, most
participants seemed to agree that bureaucratic turf battles between federal
agencies will impede any attempts to create a truly unified and coordinated
system. This situation is exacerbated by the tension between the divergent
priorities of Congress and the various federal agencies. Furthermore, there
was a concern that relevant bodies at the state and federal level do not
sufficiently collaborate with each other. While a minority of respondents

72. Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act § 3, 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6e (2006).
73. BARBARA ANDERSEN ET AL., INST. FOR NAT’L SEC. & COUNTERTERRORISM, ARE WE READY?:
A PRACTICAL EXAMINATION OF THE STRATEGIC NATIONAL STOCKPILE IN RESPONSE TO PUBLIC HEALTH
CRISES 14-15 (2006).
74. Brooke Courtney et al., Healthcare Coalitions: The New Foundation for National
Healthcare Preparedness and Response for Catastrophic Health Emergencies, 7 BIOSEC. &
BIOTERRORISM 153, 156 (2009).
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expressed a belief that this is largely due to the much documented lack of
clarity about jurisdiction and role, a separate minority articulated a concern
that states are not given sufficient voice in the development of federal
preparedness policies. By this latter account, the regularly changing and
inconsistent guidance and parameters associated with federal grants merely
confuse and frustrate states, leading to a perception that federal and state
authorities are not aligned. One respondent also identified resource
constraints as a contributing factor. This respondent expressed that most
preparedness entities, post-September 11, are dramatically under-resourced
and therefore lack the capacity to create connections with other parts of the
government that they need to get their jobs done.
b. Unity of Effort
A majority of respondents, representing all of the selected agencies,
concurred that federal agencies must jointly create a shared vision.
Harmonization is especially important today, where a great deal of funding
is directed towards preparedness efforts.75 A minority of participants noted
the multitude of stakeholders with disparate agendas fighting over the spoils.
Even though many respondents described coordination barriers, there was
an increasing sense of optimism. The dominant position was one of hope
about the direction of federal funding, finding that there seems to be an
emerging “unity of effort” related to a deliberate federal attempt to
harmonize emergency preparedness grant-making programs.
A few
respondents noted the overarching administrative attempts to harmonize
grant programs. For example, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 21
(HSPD-21), the Executive Directive establishing the National Strategy for
Public Health and Medical Preparedness, notes the necessity of a rational,
inclusive, public health response and delivery system.76 Additionally, a few
respondents mentioned the regular meetings of inter-agency workgroups to
discuss common issues, including an enterprise governance board
comprised of influential members of DHHS, DHS, and the Department of
Defense (DoD).

75. Eileen Salinsky & Elin A. Gursky, The Case for Transforming Governmental Public
Health, 25 HEALTH AFF. 1017, 1021 (2006). See also Frist, supra note 49, at 120 (stating
that federal funding has increased six hundred percent for antibioterrorism activites).
76. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE 21: PUBLIC
HEALTH AND MEDICAL PREPAREDNESS passim (2007) [hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE 21],
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc_1219263961449.shtm (indicating that this
directive will transform the national approach to protecting public health against all disasters).
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3. Issues Relating to Federal Funding
a. Matching and Maintenance Requirements
A strong minority of respondents raised issues surrounding the problem
of matching funds. Federal grants are often contingent on states allocating
a predetermined matching amount each year in order to maintain eligibility
to receive continued funding for a specific project. Such legal provisions
are designed to encourage states to allocate their own resources to
preparedness programs.
For example, the Emergency Management
Performance Grants require states to match at a fifty percent level of federal
funds.77 States that cannot commit to matching funds for preparedness
activities will be forced to reject corresponding federal funding. A similar
problem was identified relating to maintenance funding requirements.
b. Mismatched Budgetary and Appropriations Cycles
A majority of respondents discussed the reality that local, state, and
federal appropriations and budgetary cycles are frequently not aligned. At
the federal level, funds are often available for only a short time. For
example, the CDC awards money in early August, but must close its books
by mid-September.78 These mismatched cycles often do not allow enough
time for states to apply for grants or plan for the implementation of federally
funded programs.
c. Inconsistent, Single-year Funding
A strong minority also identified multiple barriers presented by
inconsistent and unpredictable grant levels, much of which has been
implemented through emergency supplemental funding in one-year
increments. Funding peaks and troughs (often associated with the rise and
fall of a specific threat, such as pandemic influenza)79 make it difficult to
create and then provide continuous support for programs.

77. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE GRANTS:
GUIDANCE AND APPLICATION KIT 5 (2008).
78. Announcement from Sharon H. Robertson, Grants Management Officer, Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention to Colleagues at Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(May 13, 2010), available at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/cdcpreparedness/coopagreement/10/
PHEP%20BP10%20Extension%20Guidance_Instructions_Appendices_05-13-2010_FINAL.pdf.
79. Jennifer B. Nuzzo, Michael Mair & Crystal Franco, Preserving Gains from Public
Health Emergency Preparedness Cooperative Agreements, 7 BIOSEC. & BIOTERRORISM 35, 36
(2009).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

174

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 4:155

4. Accountability, Performance Evaluation, and Enforcement
a. Overlapping, Inconsistent, and Unclear Grant Guidance
A few respondents discussed the implications of allowing federal funding
to come from multiple sources. With so many streams of funding, there are
a correspondingly diverse set of statutes, regulations, and agency
guidelines, all of which states are expected to follow.80 For example, one
respondent gave a detailed account of a potential confusion arising from a
discrepancy between the specific record-keeping requirements imposed by
various Office of Management and Budget (OMB) circulars and the flexible
language contained in many specific grant guidance documents. These
respondents also specifically mentioned that the volume of reporting
requirements can be overwhelming to states.
b. Role, Scope, and Effect of Grant Guidance
There was much discussion about the impact that federal grant
guidance has on state preparedness activities. The majority of respondents,
representing all selected agencies, described a generally permissive
environment with significant state flexibility to achieve broad goals
articulated by federal policy-makers. One respondent characterized grant
guidance as the laying out of objectives and expectations to help shape
state actions, with examples of allowable-type costs to provide more detail if
necessary. Another respondent acknowledged that grant guidance contains
provisions requiring certain state activities, but preferred to see grant
guidance less as an imposition of requirements and more as a way of
influencing programmatic priorities at the state and local levels. A third
respondent echoed the notion of guidance as a tool to influence state and
local priorities, but characterized his agency as a conduit between Congress
and the states, with grant guidance serving as the mechanism that helps
states determine how best to organize their preparedness activities. In slight
contrast, one respondent from DHS believed that state autonomy was
important, but also discussed how some recent grant guidance has gotten
more proscriptive by narrowing the menu of allowable activities, describing
this as a strategy to focus efforts in areas perceived to need the most urgent
work.

80. 44 C.F.R. § 13.40 (2009); NAT’L ASS’N OF COUNTY & CITY HEALTH OFFICIALS, FEDERAL
FUNDING FOR PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS: IMPLICATIONS AND ONGOING ISSUES
FOR LOCAL HEALTH DEPARTMENTS 2, 7, 9 (2007); SALINSKY, supra note 8, at 15.
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c. Progress Reporting and Monitoring
A strong minority of respondents acknowledged that objective,
quantifiable measurement of preparedness benchmarks or standards is
difficult, especially since it is hard to define preparedness and response, and
it is extremely challenging to measure these capacities outside of an actual
emergency event. Nevertheless, efforts to design appropriate metrics are
ongoing. Early progress reporting was somewhat unsuccessful: data
returned from the states had significant information missing, variation was
extremely wide, and much of the data were limited by caveats. Recently,
federal policy-makers have had success using metrics based on capacity to
act, focusing on time as the quantifiable variable.
d. Penalties for Non-compliance
Most respondents generally did not perceive punitive measures for noncompliance as a productive strategy. Consistent with other findings, the
federal officials that discussed penalties articulated the notion that they were
not looking to fund specific processes, but rather were concerned about
state-level preparedness outcomes. They saw the federal role as one of
encouraging learning and improvement in state planning and preparedness
systems; federal grants were designed to leave each jurisdiction the flexibility
to achieve the stated goal through whatever techniques or strategies they
wanted. As such, the majority of respondents repeatedly stressed that it was
never their intention or desire to articulate specific tasks, and then punish
states for failing to meet those specific goals. In fact, there was concern
expressed about mandatory punitive measures, specifically statutory withhold
requirements. Under the recent Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness
Act (PAHPA), federal agencies are required to develop performance
measures and evidence-based benchmarks.81 If states do not meet these
standards, the statute theoretically requires the withholding of funds.82 A few
respondents remained uncertain about how this provision will be
implemented and the effects it might have.

81. Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act, Pub. L. No. 109-417, § 201, 120 Stat.
2831 (2006).
82. Id. See also SARAH A. LISTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22602, PUBLIC HEALTH AND
MEDICAL PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE: ISSUES IN THE 110TH CONGRESS 2 (2008) [hereinafter
LISTER, ISSUES IN THE 110TH CONGRESS] (noting that the PAHPA gives added authority to
withhold funds for failure to meet requirements).
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C. Discussion
1. An Emerging “Shared Responsibility” Paradigm
Emergency preparedness and response has traditionally been a
predominantly local concern.83 The role of federal agencies has been
expanding in recent years, however, particularly as federal funding
These
mechanisms for emergency preparedness have proliferated.84
competing claims have resulted in predictable confusion about the proper
role for federal, state, and local governments in preparing for a public
health emergency. This was most striking after Hurricane Katrina, when
local, state, and federal preparedness and response efforts were heavily
criticized as government entities battled uncertainties about jurisdictional
authority and took turns blaming one another for shortcomings.85
As such, it was not surprising that respondents repeatedly discussed the
need for a better understanding of the various roles of state and federal
governments with respect to preparedness activities. Even though federal
policy-makers acknowledged that more clarity was needed, there was a
widely-held view that further delineation of roles should be strongly guided
by the principle of federalism. Notably, the majority of respondents did not
believe that the federal government should take an overly assertive role in
state preparedness activities. Rather, the dominant articulated view was
consistently one of complementary partnership, collaboration, and shared
responsibility; whenever possible, state autonomy should be respected, and
federal involvement should be limited to activities that it is uniquely situated
to perform.
This vision of shared responsibility is clearly still evolving. When probed
for details about the specific delineation of responsibilities, the line between
state and federal responsibilities proved to be somewhat less defined.
Certainly, broad consensus existed surrounding some types of noncontentious activities.
For example, the federal government, with
concentrated funds and access to broad scientific resources, should be
responsible for providing collective goods (e.g., medical countermeasures)
that individual states would be unable to produce on their own.
More controversially, a minority of respondents held that the federal
government should also be responsible for identifying and addressing
common barriers that might hinder preparedness activities, such as fear of
liability, or unwieldy procurement mechanisms. While all states have their
83. See SALINSKY, supra note 8.
84. See Betty Bekemeier & Jan Dahl, Turning Point Sets the Stage for Emergency
Preparedness Planning, 9 J. PUB. HEALTH MGMT. & PRAC. 377, 377 (2003).
85. See Neil Malhotra & Alexander G. Kuo, Attributing Blame: The Public’s Response to
Hurricane Katrina, 70 J. POL. 120, 120 (2008).
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own liability laws and procurement relationships,86 a couple of respondents
felt that federal actors may be in a position to more efficiently or effectively
mitigate these sorts of barriers through the passage of a national law or
policy, or through the promulgation of model laws or policies that states can
voluntarily adopt.
Finally, even though there was much discussion of partnership and
“shared responsibility” between federal and state governments, a minority of
respondents implied concern about balancing roles in a crisis. These
respondents indicated that the federal government must remain alert to the
limited abilities of state and local governments. As such, they felt that
federal policymakers must be prepared to step in with preparedness efforts
when states are not successfully preparing themselves.
It should not be surprising that the majority of federal policymakers
articulated a vision of shared preparedness responsibility.
Federal
policymakers understand that for historical, constitutional, and practical
reasons, centralized government could never replace state and local
responsibility for their populations’ health.87 But a framework of “shared
responsibility” does not answer the vital question of how to allocate and
divide roles between different levels of government. While there seems to
be an emerging consensus about the appropriateness of primary federal
involvement in some areas, and the need to defer to states whenever
possible, clearly further discussion is needed to clarify and define less
obvious roles.
2. Encouraging a Shared Focus and Coordination of Activities
A majority of respondents articulated general concern about a perceived
lack of coordination between federal agencies, and between state and
federal levels of government. A range of explanations was presented, some
unsurprising (“bureaucratic turf battles” and lack of jurisdictional clarity) and
some more intriguing. It was interesting to hear federal policymakers
articulate the notion that inter-governmental coordination could be
improved by providing more funding to states, and by articulating less
confusing federal grant guidance (discussed in more detail below).88
Even though there was significant concern about improved coordination,
optimism was an extremely common theme based on an emerging “unity of
effort.” Multiple examples of harmonization efforts were discussed and can
be divided into three categories: federal intra-agency, federal inter-agency,
and federal/state relationships. While coordination efforts continue to
86. Khi V. Thai, Public Procurement Re-Examined, 1 J. PUB. PROCUREMENT 9, 11-12
(2001).
87. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.
88. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
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evolve and expand, by all accounts they have already begun to demonstrate
some progress. Notably, officials were most enthusiastic in their description
of simple communication strategies (i.e., regularly scheduled conference
calls, working group meetings, etc.) that have helped to coordinate activities
within and among different agencies and levels of government.
Additionally, there was strong support for the idea that federal agencies can
increase shared focus and coordination through technical support and
circulation of best practices or model laws. For example, CDC provides
technical guidance to states to help them think through legal issues, without
imposing a one-size-fits-all solution.89 Instead, CDC encourages states to
address an important issue themselves, while clarifying the respective roles
of the various players at the federal and state levels.90
Unfortunately, one area where serious coordination problems remain
seems to be in the relationship between Congress and executive agencies.
Congress prefers earmarks, while agencies would like greater flexibility to
determine how to allocate the funds.91 There seems to be a disconnect
between Congress and federal agencies in terms of how agencies should
best allocate resources. Perhaps because of underlying issues with their
respective constituents, Congress seems to have a fixed understanding of
how agency funds should be spent without taking shifting agency priorities
into account.
Our previous research on federally sponsored grant programs had
indicated that the executive branch has put a number of mechanisms into
place designed to coordinate preparedness activities into a coherent
homeland security strategy.92 The interview data both supported and
brought into question the effectiveness of these programs and policies.
Taken together, the respondents’ positive and negative positions, sometimes
held by the same people, suggest that respondents know about and support
federal efforts to harmonize preparedness activities, but that concerns
remain and continued vigilance and determined effort are needed to
overcome “silos of perceived authority.”93 As one respondent appropriately
noted, any expectations of increased harmonization should be tempered by
the reality that the relevant federal programs are relatively new and are still
being fine-tuned.
89. See, e.g., Public Health Law Program, supra note 58 (“The CDC Public Health Law
Program supports and encourages applied research on the impact of law on public health
and related issues at the intersection of public health law and policy.”).
90. See SARAH A. LISTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31719, AN OVERVIEW OF THE U.S.
PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEM IN THE CONTEXT OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 5 (2005).
91. See Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Separation of Powers and the Budget
Process, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 407, 408 (2008); Salinsky & Gursky, supra note 75, at 1020.
92. See NRP, supra note 6, at 2.
93. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
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3. Unanticipated Barriers Imposed by Federal Funding Mechanisms
For many years, the federal government has provided funding and
guidance for disaster preparedness and recovery through its power to spend
for the general welfare and its power to regulate interstate commerce.94
Following the terrorist attacks of 2001 and 2002 and outbreaks of
emerging and reemerging infectious diseases, however, the federal
government began to take a more proactive role in the prevention of,
preparedness for, and response to biological weapons attacks and
infectious disease outbreaks under the auspices of providing for national
security.95 In particular, the passage of PAHPA, PREP, the creation of the
Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA),96 and
the advent of numerous grant programs97 has increased the percentage of
state and local emergency preparedness dollars provided by the federal
government.98 Since 2002, billions in federal funds have been distributed
to federal, state, and local authorities to enhance emergency preparedness
and response capabilities.99 Federal grants to state and local governments
relevant to biosecurity preparedness are primarily administered by DHS and
DHHS (primarily through CDC and ASPR).100 Our findings suggest that the
specific implementation of these federal funding mechanisms has created a
number of unanticipated effects on state preparedness activities.
First, a number of these programs (including those established by
PAHPA101) require states to commit matching or maintenance funds as a
condition of receiving certain federal grants. As the economy and property
values have declined, state revenue has followed, creating huge budgetary
shortfalls in all sectors.102 As states are unable to meet their matching or
maintenance obligations, federal law will require that federal grant dollars
be withheld or withdrawn.103 Perversely, this federally imposed grant
condition, which was designed to encourage states to prioritize
preparedness activities in their budgetary allocations, may actually lead to
decreased funding for preparedness at the state level. Loss of access to vital
federal funds will simply compound preparedness challenges in an already
94. See David P. Fidler, Constitutional Outlines of Public Health’s “New World Order,”
77 TEMP. L. REV. 247, 256 (2004).
95. BUSH, supra note 9.
96. Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act § 401, 42 U.S.C. § 247d-7e (2006).
97. LISTER, ISSUES IN THE 110TH CONGRESS, supra note 82, at 2-3.
98. See David Markenson & Robert G. Westphal, Editorial, Public Health Preparedness
Training: Resources Are There, 11 J. PUB. HEALTH MGMT. & PRAC. S1-2 (2005).
99. See LISTER, ISSUES IN THE 110TH CONGRESS, supra note 82, at 2-3.
100. SALINSKY, supra note 8, at 20; Markenson & Westphal, supra note 98.
101. Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act § 201(2).
102. See Nuzzo, Mair & Franco, supra note 79, at 1.
103. Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act § 201(2).
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difficult state budgetary environment. Unfortunately, it is unclear the extent
to which there is any discretion in the implementation of this punitive
provision. Further analysis is required to ascertain the magnitude and scope
of this problem, but if the views of these respondents are accurate, Congress
and the relevant federal agencies should consider working together to
create a procedure for suspending or waiving matching or maintenance
requirements.
Second, federal policy-makers perceived there to be a lack of
synchronization between their grant-making processes and state budgetary
cycles. According to their report, prospective information about funding
availability and magnitude can be limited, giving states very little time to
prepare an application. Magnifying this concern, states are often unable to
take advantage of federal grant programs because their fiscal years do not
line up. Thus, state budgetary planning can happen well before or well after
a federal funding window, effectively precluding participation, even when
such funding would have been desirable. Similarly, some states require that
their legislative body pass an act in order to participate in a federal grant
program,104 but some state legislatures meet infrequently, or only at certain
times of the year.105 It will be interesting to compare these findings with the
state policymaker reports, but assuming consistent accounts, federal grant
programs should strive to provide states with a longer timeframe in which to
develop and apply for funding.
Finally, respondents also identified problems related to the short
duration and unpredictability of federal preparedness programs.
Specifically, most grants have been written one year at a time, with
uncertainty about prospects for continuation or renewal.106 This aspect of
the federal funding process increases the challenge of hiring, training, and
retaining talented people.107 Preparedness efforts do not simply entail the
purchase of supplies, and the construction of infrastructure; preparedness
requires trained, competent people to fulfill the necessary functions.108
Uncertain funding creates a lack of job stability, which makes it difficult to
recruit talented and dedicated staff.
Additionally, inconsistent, single-year grants impose a significant
administrative burden on states.109 Under the current model, state officials

104. See George D. Brown, Federal Funds and National Supremacy: The Role of State
Legislatures in Federal Grant Programs, 28 AM. U. L. REV. 279, 280 (1979).
105. See 2010 State Legislative Session Calendar, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (Aug. 4, 2010), http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=18630.
106. See Nuzzo, Mair & Franco, supra note 79, at 2.
107. Id. at 1-2.
108. Id. at 2.
109. Id.
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are spending a disproportionate amount of time applying for grants each
year, rather than actually implementing programs.110 Potential momentum
is lost by always having to focus on finding and obtaining the next source of
funding. This administrative burden is particularly exacerbated for states
whose budgetary and appropriations processes do not match federal
cycles.111 As discussed above, some states must balance the tension
between their own internal budgetary processes and out-of-phase federal
requirements;112 negotiating this fault line year after year can impede
attempts to think about and implement long term, comprehensive
preparedness strategies.
This barrier could be mitigated if federal
preparedness grant programs focused on increasing the availability of
multiple-year grants, and clarifying whenever possible the long-term funding
prospects for specific preparedness programs.
4. Evolving Accountability and Performance Evaluation Procedures
Respondent comments indicated that there has been an evolution in the
way that grant guidance is developed. In the early years post 9/11, grant
requirements and guidance came directly from the departmental level, with
very little state and local involvement.113 Because of ensuing confusion
about how this guidance could be interpreted, federal policymakers began
reaching out to state and local public health officials [often through national
associations such as the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials
(ASTHO) or National Association of County and City Health Officials
(NACCHO)] to create a shared understanding of the meaning and intent of
This cooperative decision-making
grant guidance requirements.114
arrangement lasted until DHS stepped into a coordinating role and began
to implement top-down explanations of grant guidance requirements,
including articulation of specific target capabilities and preparedness
metrics.115 CDC has continued to create a looser grant guidance system
that provides more generalized instructions, delegating more flexibility to the
states.116 These competing models continue to exist in parallel, but

110. Id.
111. Nuzzo, Mair & Franco, supra note 79, at 2.
112. See id. See also discussion supra Part IV.C.3.
113. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT GUIDE 2 (2006)
[hereinafter FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT GUIDE], available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
Grants_FinancialManagementGuide.pdf (setting out guidelines for DHS grant recipients).
114. See SALINSKY, supra note 8, at 17-22; Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y, Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., Address at Public Health Preparedness Summit (Feb. 16, 2010), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/secretary/about/speeches/sp20100216.html.
115. See generally FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT GUIDE, supra note 113, at 1-49 (laying out
specific federal grant guidelines).
116. See discussion supra Part IV.B.4.
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respondents seemed to indicate that there is a prevailing trend away from
top-down, explicitly directive grant guidance.
This finding was reinforced by several respondent comments discussing
the role of grant guidance. Most argued that states should be given wide
flexibility to act within a broad framework articulated by the federal
government. While respondents articulated different models for the specific
role of federal guidelines (i.e., goals, objectives, expectations, “allowabletype costs,” “programmatic priorities”) the majority were consistent in stating
that they preferred not to see grant guidance as an imposition of
requirements.
Progress reporting and monitoring were frequently mentioned
mechanisms for determining whether states are achieving the federal
government’s articulated goals. Consistent with the notion of grant
guidance as a flexible framework, there seemed to be more interest in
measuring overall capacity-building, rather than specific steps along the
way. In other words, according to the respondents, progress reporting was
designed to be outcomes-oriented, rather than process-based. As long as
the state goals are consistent with federal guidance and policy, most specific
activities will be allowed (as long as they are not grossly wasteful).
Consistent with this paradigm are select grant programs that require
states to articulate a periodic work plan, outlining what progress was made
with the previous allotment of resources, and what they intend to do with the
next segment of funds.117 These plans are not intended to lay out specific
intermediate steps, but rather should lay out the state’s preparedness goals
in a narrative form. These narrative reports provide a contextual base for
federal project officers to collaboratively work with states that are not
achieving their goals; given federal technical expertise, project officers can
help states understand what their needs are and can help them construct
strategies for filling those gaps. This collaborative strategy has been
extremely helpful in engaging states as co-creators in the process, thus
encouraging state buy-in and enthusiastic cooperation.
All of these findings point towards a federal conception of accountability
and performance evaluation that stresses flexibility and state autonomy.
Even with a trend towards more flexible grant guidance, however, there was
concern that the high volume of grant guidance documents can still pose a
significant barrier. Competing agency requirements and inconsistent
language can create a complicated web of overlapping administrative,
accounting, and reporting obligations, which can ultimately become an
impediment to actual programmatic accomplishments.
Furthermore,
according to federal policymakers, it seems as if states are sometimes

117. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 143-16, 341 (1983).
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confused about the content of various requirements, and spend unnecessary
time attempting to ascertain what is required of them.
Given the complexity and volume of these preparedness grant
programs, respondents were asked to discuss enforcement mechanisms and
punitive measures at their disposal for worst-case scenarios where states
repeatedly fail to advance preparedness goals. Interestingly, respondents
described a fairly non-draconian view of penalties for non-compliance.
According to one respondent, prior to recent legislation, there was no
requirement, or even ability to penalize states for non-compliance. Federal
grant makers could of course always have chosen to reduce or eliminate a
state’s funding for a given project, but that would have been a prospective
action, rather than retrospective punishment.
This does not mean that there is no willingness to lean on states when
necessary. There was limited discussion of ways to encourage specific state
action short of using the threat of explicit punishment. For example, one
respondent described a grant review process technique called “restriction”
which involves actively working with states that have a good idea for
spending federal money, but have not yet amassed sufficient information to
justify implementation. A restriction would be placed on the targeted money
in the state accounts that would not be removed until a mutual agreement
has been reached.
Nevertheless, there was widespread concern about the ramifications of
new statutorily mandated withhold requirements that are going into effect
soon. While there is some limited discretion at the secretary level to relax
these penalties, the fear is that once this provision goes into effect, federal
grant programs will be forced to start pulling back funds. For example,
PAHPA mandates a ten percent withhold per year, with the percentage of
withheld funds increasing by an additional five percent for each consecutive
failure.118 The prospect of these penalties was universally expressed as an
extremely undesirable outcome. Respondents hoped that senior officials will
either grant waivers (in the case of mandatory withhold provisions) or will
choose not to implement (in the case of authorized, but non-mandatory
withhold powers). In the meantime, federal grants programs are working
closely with states in danger of failing, with the aim of helping them
understand and meet the performance metrics.119

118. Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act § 201(2), 42 U.S.C. § 247d-3a (2006).
119. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-915, BIOTERRORISM:
FEDERAL RESEARCH AND PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES 2, 13-65 (2001) (discussing previous instances
of federal guidance for states’ expenditures of grant funds).
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5. Respondent Knowledge of Objective Legal Environment
An earlier phase of this project involved a detailed description of the
objective legal environment. To examine how law affects the structure of the
public health system and its ability to respond more effectively to the threat
of emerging infectious disease threats and other public health preparedness
needs, we first described, categorized, and analyzed current federal
mandates and funding arrangements affecting state and local public health
systems. This work was based on the premise that federal law provides a
general structure and framework for public health activities, while state and
local law provides parameters for the implementation and delivery of
specific programs and services. Our research in federal law focused on
identifying specific topical mandates, as well as analyzing funding
mechanisms provided to achieve those mandates.
Throughout the analysis of the federal policymaker interviews, we crossreferenced their statements with our earlier research on the objective legal
environment. We felt that it was important to ascertain the extent to which
respondents had knowledge of the broad legal environment and the degree
to which their understanding of federal preparedness laws and policies was
consistent with our objective legal findings. In general, this analysis was very
positive. Across all agencies and levels of seniority, respondents generally
had a strong and accurate understanding of federal preparedness laws.
Respondents were universally able to describe a wide range of detailed
programs and were capable of discussing broad legal themes.
Nevertheless, two potential discrepancies emerged.
First, while
respondents possessed a detailed and accurate understanding of the federal
preparedness environment, their comments seemed to focus on laws and
programs related to their agency and specific area of emphasis. It is
understandable, and even predictable, that policymakers would have a
tendency to discuss the topics with which they are most comfortable. It does
not necessarily follow from a lack of comment breadth that they are
unfamiliar with federal grant programs outside of their jurisdiction. Further
research could be conducted to determine whether federal policymakers, in
fact, do only focus on the most immediately relevant aspects of federal
preparedness laws, and whether this has any ramifications for harmonization
of federal preparedness efforts.
Second, federal policymakers did not extensively discuss the possibility
that the federal legal environment could be causing confusion at the state
and local levels. Our early research highlighted the complexity and
ambiguity in federal grant programs. We hypothesized that state and local
public health officials could be experiencing significant difficulty
distinguishing between the actions that the federal government requires
them to perform as a condition of funding, versus those actions that are
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merely suggested or encouraged. Federal policymakers were quite frank in
articulating the numerous barriers imposed by federal funding mechanisms,
but did not include lack of clarity as a potential difficulty that states might
face.
D. Conclusion
Engaging in public health preparedness involves a monumental and
constantly shifting set of interwoven activities. The goal of these interviews
was to explore how federal policymakers see their role in the array of
preparedness endeavors. Unsurprisingly, more work needs to be done to
define the line between federal and state roles and to coordinate priorities.
Nevertheless, there are many hopeful signs that federal policymakers are at
least aware of these challenges and are actively trying to improve the
collaborative relationships vital to preparedness efforts.
More surprising was the articulated view that federal preparedness
funding mechanisms should be seen as driving priorities, rather than
imposing specific requirements. One of the project’s original core research
questions concerned the extent to which the federal government was using
its spending power to mandate certain state preparedness actions. At least
according to the federal policymaker data, federal law is affecting state
preparedness activities less through mandates and more through
unanticipated barriers created by federal funding mechanisms. Additional
research needs to be done to establish the nature and scope of these
barriers, and to develop specific policy solutions, particularly after analyzing
the state and local case studies in light of these findings.
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